Esta investigación se emprende motivada por la necesidad de desentrañar la progresión delos modelos de aprendizaje, los cuales se han ido adaptando para responder a las demandas de lasociedad en su dinámica constante de fluctuación y transformaciones. El objetivo de este trabajo es examinar de forma sistemática la evolución de los modelos de aprendizaje, destacando los cambios paradigmáticos que han favorecido la transición de enfoques de aprendizaje tradicionales hacia propuestas más innovadoras y transdisciplinarias. Para lograrlo, se lleva a cabo un (...) análisis bibliográfico apoyado en el método hermenéutico para la interpretación contextual de la literatura y los discursos, a fin de desentrañar las complejidades inherentes en la evolución de los modelos de aprendizaje. Los resultados resaltan la influencia limitante del paradigma de la simplicidad en laformación educativa tradicional y la necesidad de un giro hacia la dialogicidad y la colaboración eintegración disciplinaria para avanzar hacia la complejidad. Se concluye argumentando a favor de la adopción del paradigma de la complejidad, abogando por una epistemología transdisciplinariay un enfoque de aprendizaje interestructurante, que permitan el desarrollo humano integral.El reconocimiento de la complejidad humana en la enseñanza y el aprendizaje exige una transformación radical de la educación hacia prácticas más holísticas y transformadoras, esenciales para construir una sociedad equitativa y justa. (shrink)

The question of how the probabilistic opinions of different individuals should be aggregated to form a group opinion is controversial. But one assumption seems to be pretty much common ground: for a group of Bayesians, the representation of group opinion should itself be a unique probability distribution, 410–414, [45]; Bordley Management Science, 28, 1137–1148, [5]; Genest et al. The Annals of Statistics, 487–501, [21]; Genest and Zidek Statistical Science, 114–135, [23]; Mongin Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 313–351, [46]; Clemen and (...) Winkler Risk Analysis, 19, 187–203, [7]; Dietrich and List [14]; Herzberg Theory and Decision, 1–19, [28]). We argue that this assumption is not always in order. We show how to extend the canonical mathematical framework for pooling to cover pooling with imprecise probabilities by employing set-valued pooling functions and generalizing common pooling axioms accordingly. As a proof of concept, we then show that one IP construction satisfies a number of central pooling axioms that are not jointly satisfied by any of the standard pooling recipes on pain of triviality. Following Levi, 3–11, [39]), we also argue that IP models admit of a much better philosophical motivation as a model of rational consensus. (shrink)

This book challenges the view that bad beliefs - beliefs that blatantly conflict with easily available evidence - can largely be explained by widespread irrationality, instead arguing that ordinary people are rational agents whose beliefs are the result of their rational response to the evidence they're presented with.

Neil Van Leeuwen argues that many religious people do not act and infer as we would expect believers to act and infer, and on this basis argues that they are not genuine believers. They take some other, nondoxastic, attitude to the claims they profess to believe. In this short commentary, I argue that in many (but far from all) such cases, the content, and not the attitude, explains the departures from the inferential and behavioral stereotype we associate with belief.

Mental acts are conspicuously absent from philosophical debates over the nature of action. A typical protagonist of a typical scenario is far more likely to raise her arm or open the window than she is to perform a calculation in her head or talk to herself silently. One possible explanation for this omission is that the standard ‘causalist’ account of action, on which acts are analyzed in terms of mental states causing bodily movements, faces difficulties in accommodating some paradigmatic cases (...) of mental action – or so I argue. After drawing out these objections to causalism, I outline a more promising approach. Building on previous work, I show how the approach I favour, on which the attempt to analyze action is dispensed with, provides a unified account of both mental and physical action. (shrink)

Predicted relationships between media preference and authoritarianism were derived from theoretical and experimental studies. It was hypothesized that authoritarians would be more likely to believe their preferred media sources than would nonauthoritarians, and that the authoritarian’s position on political issues would be closer to the position represented by positively evaluated media but farther from the position of negatively evaluated media. Results from mail questionnaires obtained from 445 Detroit adults supported the hypotheses. Coercive force also was strongly related to authoritarianism when (...) the media were described as disagreeing with the views of important political leaders. (shrink)

The Virginia School's economics of natural equals makes consent critical for policy. Democracy is understood as government by discussion, not majority rule. The claim of efficiency unsupported by consent, as common in orthodox economics, appeals to social hierarchy. Politics becomes an act of exchange among equals where the economist is only entitled to offer advice to citizens, not to dictators. The foundation of natural equality and consent explains the common themes of James Buchanan and John Rawls as well as Ronald (...) Coase and the Fabian socialists. What orthodox economics treats as efficient racial discrimination violates the fair chance entitlement to which people consent in a market economy. The importance of replication stressed by Gordon Tullock, developing themes from Karl Popper, is another expression of natural equality since the foresight of replication induces care into research. The publication of previously unpublished correspondence and documentation allows the reader to judge recent controversy. (shrink)

McKenna’s critique (rather than criticisms) of idealized approaches to epistemology is an important contribution to the literature. In this brief discussion, I set out his main concerns about more idealized approaches, within and beyond social epistemology, before turning to some issues I think he neglects. I suggest that it’s important to pay attention to the prestige hierarchy in philosophy, and to how that hierarchy can serve ideological purposes. The greater prestige of more abstract approaches plays a role in determining what (...) issues and what voices we attend to. (shrink)

Joseph Hannon has expressed a most surprising objection to Aquinas scholar Prof William E. Carroll in his latest paper “Theological Objections to a Metaphysicalist Interpretation of Creation.” The main claim is that Prof. Carroll misunderstands Aquinas' doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by reducing it to a metaphysical notion, rather than considering it in its full theological sense. In this paper I show Hannon's misinterpretation of Carroll's and Thomas Aquinas' thought, particularly by stressing the dependence that the doctrine of providence through (...) secondary causes has on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. (shrink)

In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally affective and (ii) deeply interlinked with interoceptive and homeostatic bodily processes. However, this view still needs further development to be part of any rigorous theory of consciousness. To advance in this direction, we ask: (1) is there any affective type that is always present in consciousness?, (2) is it related to interoception and homeostasis?, and (3) what are its properties? Here we analyse and compare Jim Russell's (...) core affect and Thomas Fuchs' concept of vitality, and propose a more encompassing notion that subsumes both: continuous organismic sentience. It provides affirmative answers to questions 1 and 2, and, regarding question 3, a preliminary list of thirteen properties divided into ontological, phenomenological, and functional categories. This is the first of a series of studies that will systematically address different notions of a fundamental, homeostatically-rooted affective type, to achieve a rigorous, unified concept for consciousness science. (shrink)

The relevance of inner speech for human psychology, especially for higher-order cognitive functions, is widely recognized. However, the study of the phenomenology of inner speech, that is, what it is like for a subject to experience internally speaking his/her voice, has received much less attention. This study explores the subjective experience of inner speech through empathy for pain paradigm. To this end, an experimental phenomenological method was implemented. Sixteen healthy subjects were exposed to videos of sportswomen/sportsmen having physical accidents practicing (...) extreme sports. Immediately after the exposure to the stimuli, a phenomenological interview was conducted to gather data about bodily sensations, emotions, motivations, and inner speech of watching other people’s accidents. Participant’s inner speech expresses concern about the consequences the accident could generate to the sportswomen/sportsmen or about the participants themselves. Simultaneously, participants’ inner speech happened with negative emotional feelings, many sensations distributed throughout their bodies, and a felt knowledge coming from a meaningful but pre-reflective and pre-verbal bodily dimension. Our findings show that inner speech in empathy is not merely a psycholinguistic process or high-order cognitive function, but rather it is a complex experience that occurs deeply related to meaningful emotions, bodily sensations, and an implicit, somatically felt knowledge. (shrink)

Abstract The typical explanation of an event or process which attracts the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is an explanation that conflicts with the account advanced by the relevant epistemic authorities. I argue that both for the layperson and for the intellectual, it is almost never rational to accept such a conspiracy theory. Knowledge is not merely shallowly social, in the manner recognized by social epistemology, it is also constitutively social: many kinds of knowledge only become accessible thanks to the agent's embedding (...) in an environment that includes other epistemic agents. Moreover, advances in knowledge typically require ongoing immersion in this social environment. But the intellectual who embraces a conspiracy theory risks cutting herself off from this environment, and therefore epistemically disabling herself. Embracing a conspiracy theory therefore places at risk the ability to engage in genuine enquiry, including the enquiry needed properly to evaluate the conspiracy theory. (shrink)

Defends and transforms naturalism and materialism to show how culture itself is formed by nature. Bryant endorses a pan-ecological theory of being, arguing that societies are ecosystems that can only be understood by considering nonhuman material agencies such as rivers and mountain ranges alongside signifying agencies such as discourses, narratives and ideologies.

Moral realism is often taken to have common sense and initial appearances on its side. Indeed, by some lights, common sense and initial appearances underlie all the central positive arguments for moral realism. We offer a kind of debunking argument, taking aim at realism’s common sense standing. Our argument differs from familiar debunking moves both in its empirical assumptions and in how it targets the realist position. We argue that if natural selection explains the objective phenomenology of moral deliberation and (...) judgement, then this undermines arguments from that phenomenology. This results in a simpler, and in some ways more direct, challenge to realism. It is also less vulnerable to the main objections that have been leveled against such arguments. If accepted, our conclusion should make a real difference to the dialectic in this area. It means that neither realism nor its denial is the default, to-be-refuted, position. (shrink)

I wish to express, first of all, my profound gratitude to Professor J. M. Bochenski, without whose assistance the present work would have not been possible. To be concise, I would like to state that his contribution to this book may be viewed at three levels: (1) that of the general spirit, (2) that of the specific ideas, theses or approaches which are expressed in its pages, (3) that of this work qua doctoral dissertation. The general spirit which has guided (...) my research coincides with that underlying Professor :Oochenski's own works, in particular his Formale Logik (Munchen 1956). Moreover, the particular occasion which suggested my investigation was a statement included in that book according to which the literature in the field still lacked a detailed work on Frege (p. 317). I wish, likewise, to express my gratitude to other professors of the University of Fribourg for their generous help. I mention especially Professors P. Wyser, M. D. Philippe, N. Luyten, and V. Kuiper. I have also benefited from Professor E. Specker's lectures at the Eidge nossische Technische Hochschule (ZUrich) and from Professor Olof Gigon's lectures at the University of Bern. From an earlier period I wish to express my gratitude to the professors of the philosophy department of the Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, especially the late Professor Francisco Romero. The Swiss National Library (Bern) has greatly facilitated access to bibliographical sources, and the library of the University of Munster (Westphalien) has kindly provided microfilms of Frege's Nachlap. (shrink)

El problema que Bradwardine ha de afrontar como central en su antropología,consiste en mostrar hasta qué punto es libre el hombre, y qué implica esa libertad humana. Esta es la cuestión fundamental y sobre ella gravita todo lo que el Doctor profirndus piensa acerca de Dios. Pero para afrontarla con rigor, si bien Tomás Bradwardine no lo indica específicamente en su obra, es convenientehacer ver que el problema afecta a dos órdenes diferentes, tanto de la realidad como del estudio de (...) la misma. Uno de estos órdenes, e natural, se refiere al hombre en cuanto criatura, capaz, como se verá, de elegir libremente, y, por tanto, no sometida a la necesidad de un modo determinante, así como a la cooperación general de las causas primera y segundas en todo obrar en cuanto tal. Es en este orden donde Bradwardine habrá de intentar hacer compatibles los atributos divinos y la libertad de elección humana, el libre albedrío. Porsu parte, los problemas planteados en el orden sobrenatural, el orden de la gracia, pertenecen a la teología revelada. Se abordan cuestiones como la de si el hombre es capaz de hacer el bien y liberarse del pecado por sí mismo, sin el auxilio de la gracia, si puede salvarse por sus propias fuerzas, si está en sus manos el initumfidei... Bradwardine afrontará el problema de la libertad, eje de su antropología, en relación a ambos órdenes, pues reivindicar al hombre como ser completo equivale a reivindicarlo como libre, se pone en juego su verdadera humanidad. (shrink)

El problema de la libertad es uno de los más áridos de la filosofía. Paul Ricoeur intenta reconstruir el problema tomando el eje del análisis: la naturaleza dicotómica de los discursos sostenidos sobre la cuestión. De un lado, tenemos la “perspectiva de la tercera persona”. Desde esta mirada, cada acto que realizamos está causalmente determinada. Por el otro lado, tenemos la “perspectiva de la tercera persona”, en la que todas nuestras acciones libres parecieran brotar del “yo”. El problema comienza cuando (...) intentamos reconciliar ambas perspectivas. Este trabajo revisará algunos de los argumentos presentados por ambos lados, y el posicionamiento de Ricoeur en el debate. (shrink)

En este trabajo propongo una definición pragmática de la falacia de petición de principio. En la primera parte considero y rechazo la sugerencia de Frank Jackson de que la argumentación posee otro fin además del de convencer racionalmente a nuestro interlocutor de que algo es el caso. En la segunda parte ofrezco la definición. En la tercera parte hablo brevemente acerca de la representación de argumentos por medio de grafos. Finalmente, en la cuarta parte aplico la definición propuesta a algunos (...) ejemplos de argumentos.---“A Pragmatic Definition of the Begging the Question Fallacy”. A pragmatic definition of the Begging the question fallacy is presented in this paper. In the first part of it I consider and reject Frank Jackson’s suggestion according to which argumentation possesses a different end than rationally persuading an audience that something is the case. The definition is presented in part II. Part III refers briefly to the representation of arguments through graphs. Finally, in part IV, the proposed definition is applied to some argument examples. (shrink)

v. 1. bk. 1. Immortality of the soul -- v. 2. bk. 2. Dreams, divination, and prophecy. bk. 3. Divine knowledge. bk. 4. Divine providence -- v. 3. bk. 5. The heavenly bodies and their movers, the relationships amongst these movers, and the relationship between them and God. bk. 6. Creation of the universe.

La viabilidad del modelo de la sociedad de bienestar se encuentra en entredicho. El argumento de la insostenibilidad económica de su realización ha propiciado una versión muy limitada de su efecto redistributivo y transformador que limita su radio de acción a la satisfacción de las necesidades más perentorias del individuo. La rehabilitación del modelo reclama la ponderación razonada de la densidad normativa de los bienes en juego que en ningún caso pudiera derivar en la discriminación en el disfrute de los (...) derechos concernidos. Se impone al respecto el cumplimiento irrestricto de los deberes generales positivos enderezados a la eliminación de los condicionamientos de las voluntades individuales que conforman el consenso definiendo el sentido democrático de las políticas de bienestar. (shrink)

En este trabajo, nos proponemos redefinir las posturas que toman parte en el debate entre realismo y antirrealismo científicos, dejando de concebirlas únicamente como doctrinas o teorías que describen cómo es el mundo. En cambio, acorde al camino iniciado por van Fraassen en The empirical stance, optamos por definirlas como stances: políticas, estrategias o perspectivas a partir de las cuales construimos creencias fácticas. Así, en primera instancia nos dedicamos a entender qué es una stance y cómo caracterizar esta noción. En (...) segundo lugar, exploramos metodologías y enfoques para tratar el realismo y el antirrealismo como stances, y, en esta clave, definirlos adecuadamente. Por último, examinamos el impacto de esta propuesta en la explicación de los acuerdos y desacuerdos en el debate, evaluando los grados de afinidad o distancia en las perspectivas en juego. (shrink)

How does valuing something for its own sake differ from valuing an entity for the sake of other things? Although numerous answers come to mind, many of them rule out substantive views about what is valuable for its own sake. I therefore seek to provide a more neutral way to distinguish the two valuing attitudes. Drawing from existing accounts of valuing, I argue that the two can be distinguished in terms of a conative-volitional feature. Focusing first on “non-final valuing”—i.e. valuing_ (...) x_ for the sake of something else—I argue that it involves adopting certain reasons on account of a desire for _x_ to contribute to other things. I then show how this contrasts final valuing. The result, I argue, is a plausible account of how the two modes of valuing differ that leaves open substantive views about what all can be valued for its own sake. This is helpful because it develops a popular methodology used to explore the value of a wide range of things, including natural entities, family heirlooms, and artworks, as well as, more broadly, entities that might have “extrinsic final value.”. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. (shrink)

Most philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness underlies, or at any rate makes a large contribution, to moral considerability. This paper argues that many such accounts invoke question-begging arguments. Moreover, they’re unable to explain apparent differences in moral status across and within different species. In the light of these problems, I argue that we ought to take very seriously a view according to which moral considerability is grounded in functional properties. Phenomenal consciousness may be sufficient for having a moral value, but (...) it may not be necessary, and it may contribute relatively little to our overall considerability. (shrink)

Continental philosophy has entered a new period of ferment. The long deconstructionist era was followed with a period dominated by Deleuze, which has in turn evolved into a new situation still difficult to define. However, one common thread running through the new brand of continental positions is a renewed attention to materialist and realist options in philosophy. Among the leaders of the established generation, this new focus takes numerous forms. It might be hard to find many shared positions in the (...) writings of Badiou, DeLanda, Laruelle, Latour, Stengers, and Žižek, but what is missing from their positions is an obsession with the critique of written texts. All of them elaborate a positive ontology, despite the incompatibility of their results. Meanwhile, the new generation of continental thinkers is pushing these trends still further, as seen in currents ranging from transcendental materialism to the London-based speculative realism movement to new revivals of Derrida. As indicated by the title The Speculative Turn, the new currents of continental philosophy depart from the text-centered hermeneutic models of the past and engage in daring speculations about the nature of reality itself. This anthology assembles authors, of several generations and numerous nationalities, who will be at the centre of debate in continental philosophy for decades to come. (shrink)

From one end of his philosophical work to the other, Gilles Deleuze consistently described his position as a transcendental empiricism. But just what is transcendental about Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism? And how does his position fit with the traditional empiricism articulated by Hume? In Difference and Givenness , Levi Bryant addresses these long-neglected questions so critical to an understanding of Deleuze’s thinking. Through a close examination of Deleuze’s independent work--focusing especially on Difference and Repetition-- as well as his engagement with thinkers (...) such as Kant, Mai;mon, Bergson, and Simondon, Bryant sets out to unearth Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and to show how it differs from transcendental idealism, absolute idealism, and traditional empiricism. What emerges from these efforts is a metaphysics that strives to articulate the conditions for real existence, capable of accounting for the individual itself without falling into conceptual or essentialist abstraction. In Bryant’s analysis, Deleuze’s metaphysics articulates an account of being as process or creative individuation based on difference, as well as a challenging critique--and explanation--of essentialist substance ontologies. A clear and powerful discussion of how Deleuze’s project relates to two of the most influential strains in the history of philosophy, this book will prove essential to anyone seeking to understand Deleuze’s thought and its specific contribution to metaphysics and epistemology. (shrink)

We extend the languages of both basic and graded modal logic with the infinity diamond, a modality that expresses the existence of infinitely many successors having a certain property. In both cases we define a natural notion of bisimilarity for the resulting formalisms, that we dub $\mathtt {ML}^{\infty }$ and $\mathtt {GML}^{\infty }$, respectively. We then characterise these logics as the bisimulation-invariant fragments of the naturally corresponding predicate logic, viz., the extension of first-order logic with the infinity quantifier. Furthermore, for (...) both $\mathtt {ML}^{\infty }$ and $\mathtt {GML}^{\infty }$ we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation for the set of formulas that are valid in every Kripke frame, we prove a small model property with respect to a widened class of weighted models, and we establish decidability of the satisfiability problem. (shrink)

This paper examines the value awarded by Duns Escoto to the defence of god -understood as Lave- who acts in a completely free mannner and is omnipotent. I also studies the implications of his philosophical position when confrontingthe relationships between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, intellect and will, necessity and contingency. His analysis of The Philosopher, Aristotle, is also discussed.

Thomas Bradwardine fue, con Guillermo de Ockham, tal vez el pensador más destacado del siglo XIV Influyó en los terrenos de la lógica, la ciencia (matemáticas y física) y la teología. Su obra más importante fue: De Causa Dei con fra Pellagium et D e virtute causarum. En ella aborda profundamente un problema fundamental, discutido antes y después (sobre todo en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII): el de la libertad del hombre, el de la posible concordia entre necesidad y (...) libertad. (shrink)

What can Dungeons & Dragons teach us about the being of beings? This article argues that Dungeons & Dragons introduces us to a world composed of objects or entities, where the being of objects is defined not by their qualities, but rather by their powers, capacities or affects. Drawing on the thought of Spinoza, Deleuze and Molnar, objects are seen to be defined by what they can do or their capacities to act, such that qualities are effects of these acts. (...) Dungeons & Dragons is particularly suited to showing us this insofar as it focuses on the action of entities. (shrink)

Le bilan d'une vie marquée par la littérature, la peinture et la musique, et une introduction à l'oeuvre de l'anthropologue. Il évoque son itinéraire intellectuel, ses voyages et ses rencontres, ses goûts et ses aversions. Publié à l'occasion de son centenaire.